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K.: Criminal Law--Effect of Pardon on Habitual Criminal Statute
CASE COMMENTS
Thus, the right of privacy at best is very limited, and the court
jealously guards against its invocation to the prejudice of the
rights of others as indicated by Martin v. Struthers, supra. Applying
the doctrine of abatement of noise as a nuisance, we may constructively state that only where the infringement is excessive and uneasonable to a man of ordinary sensibilities will the court consider
bringing into play right of privacy. Here, the programs were not
unreasonable, and the great majority of passengers found them
inoffensive and favored their continuance; D does not represent
the ordinary man. The holding of the court appears just, considering the rights of all persons involved. In answering Mr. Justice
Douglas's objection, if ever control of the mind were threatened,
then such would be clearly unreasonable and a valid basis for
objection.
G. D. H. S.

CRIMINAL LAW-EFFECT OF PARDON ON HABITUAL CRIMINAL

STATuT.-Habeas corpus proceeding by P to obtain release from
imprisonment for life for third offense under the habitual criminal
statute [W. VA. CODE c. 61, art. 11, §§ 18 and 19 (Michie, 1949) ].
P claimed that the statute did not apply since, after commission and
conviction of first two offenses punishable by confinement in the
penitentiary, he was given a pardon by the governor. The circuit
court overruled D's demurrer to the petition and, on joint motion
of the parties, certified the question to the supreme court. Held,
that a pardon by the governor of convictions for offenses punishable by confinement in the penitentiary does not exempt the
prisoner from increased punishment under the habitual criminal
statute. Reversed and remanded. Dean v. Skeen, 70 S.E.2d 256
(W. Va. 1952).
This is the first case in West Virginia determining the effect
of a full pardon on the application of the habitual criminal statute.
In State v. Fisher, 123 W. Va. 745, 18 S.E.2d 649 (1941), the
court, in dealing with a conditional pardon, held that it had no
effect upon prior convictions and that the habitual criminal statute
applied. The court also expressed the opinion that an unconditional
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pardon of a prior offense would not serve to destroy the historical
effect of the conviction thereof.
In State ex rel. Coole v. Sims, 133 W. Va. 619, 629, 58 S.E.2d
784, 790 (1950), it was said: "It will not do to say, nor do any ot
the authorities say, that the granting of a pardon wipes out the
conviction and renders the party innocent dating back to the time
he was convicted .... Neither the Governor of this State, nor the
Court of Claims, nor the Legislature, has any constitutional power
to pass upon the guilt or innocence of a person charged with a
crime. That power rests, under our Constitution, in the judicial
department of the State government."
Executive clemency, while being a constitutional power, not
subject to legislative control, is however, subject to legislative regulation which prescribes that a second conviction, without excepting
pardon or parole from the first, shall incur the penalty prescribed
in the habitual criminal statute. State v. Fisher, supra.
In making the decision in the instant case, our court goes
along with the weight of authority. See People ex rel. Prisament
v. Brophy, 317 U.S. 625 (1942). The minority view is based upon
the theory that an unconditional pardon serves to wipe out all
the effects of the prior conviction and makes the offender a "new
man", just as though he had never committed the crime. State
v. Childers, 197 La. 715, 2 So.2d 189 (1941). The instant case
discredits such a position by pointing out that the criminal character or habits of the individual, the chief postulate of habitual
criminal statutes, is often as clearly disclosed by a pardoned conviction as by one never condoned.
E. W. K.

CRIMINAL LAW-INSTRUCTION
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FAc.-On

trial for murder, D relied on self-defense. He was being treated in
a hostile and threatening manner by two persons acting in concert,
which led to the fatal shooting of one of them. D was convicted
of second degree murder. One point of error assigned in the
appellate court was the giving of an instruction which stated his
right of self-defense against the deceased only, omitting any mention
of the fact that there were two parties acting hostilely toward him.
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